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TARASOFF v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA: PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S OBLIGATION
OF CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS THE
DUTY TO WARN
What is the extent of the psychotherapist's1 duty to protect third
persons whose safety may be threatened by his patients? In Tarasoff
v. Regents of the University of California,2 the California Supreme
Court held that psychotherapists, and presumably psychiatrists as well,
have a duty to warn third parties of the possible dangers of bodily harm
to which they are exposed by patients of the psychotherapist. This
note will examine the traditional standards employed to impose the
duty to protect third parties from unreasonable danger or harm, the
alteration of these standards by Tarasoff and the conflict engendered
by the Tarasoff holding between the psychotherapist's duty to warn and
his duty of confidentiality to his patients.
Duty to Protect Third Persons
The psychotherapist's failure to protect persons endangered by a
patient is an act of nonfeasance which, for the most part, is a very
limited concept. It may, however, be characterized as follows:
A previous course of action, not in itself creating risks to
others, may have brought the actor into certain socially recog-
nized relations with others which are of such a character as
to require affirmative acts to protect them from risks which
the person required to act had no part in creating. The
failure to perform such an act is described as nonfeasance.
1. Psychotherapy involves a
relationship which exists between two persons (or more, where marriage coun-
seling or group therapy is involved) where one (or more) is seeking help in
the solution of a mental problem caused by psychological and/or environ-
mental pressures from another whose training and status are such as to warrant
other persons confiding in him for the purpose of such help.
Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications,
10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 617 (1964).
2. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). This case vacated
the opinion in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d
553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
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The situation is more easily comprehended by treating [it]
...as. .. one depending upon the relationship of the par-
ties. The principle is thus ordinarily formulated that while
an actor is always bound to prevent his acts from creating
an unreasonable risk to others [misfeasance], he is under the
affirmative duty to act to prevent another from sustaining
harm only when certain socially recognized relations exist
which constitute the basis for the legal duty.3
As a result of the narrowly defined social relationship which is re-
quired in nonfeasance cases, there is typically no duty to control the
conduct of a person so as to prevent his harming third parties; however,
there are exceptions to this rule where certain relationships exist. The
special relationships that generally create this duty may be included
within one of two classifications: (1) those in which the relationship
between the actor and the party threatened with harm is such that the
actor may be required to protect the party from harm and (2) those
in which the relationship between the actor and the person threatening
harm to the third party is such that the actor may be required to con-
trol the former's conduct.4
The psychotherapist's duty to third parties threatened, or potenti-
ally endangered, by his patients falls within the latter category.; Be-
cause of the psychotherapist's relationship with his patients or clients,
the psychotherapist is deemed to be in a position to "control" his
patient's conduct and may be legally required to do so in appropriate
circumstances.6
Control in this area of negligence law has traditionally meant
physical control over the person of the primary tortfeasor. The amount
of physical control over another which is required for the imposition
of tort liability is not a matter which can be mathematically ascertained.
In cases involving emotionally or mentally ill patients, the degree of
3.. Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 34 YALE L.J.
886, 887 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Harper & Kime]. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
LAw OF ToRTs, 1054 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314, comment c
(1965).
4. Harper & Xime, supra note 3, at 887-88. See W. PROSSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS, 348-50 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; RESTATEmENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS, §§ 314A-311.5 (1965).
5. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 349-50; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 319,
comment a (1965); Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at 897-98.
6. The relationship of psychotherapist and patient is necessarily a very close and
confidential one. Naturally, the psychotherapist must have a certain degree of psy-
chological control over the patient. However, it is not actual control that is definitive
of the relationship, but rather the ability to control. See note 11 infra and accompany-
ing text.
[Vol. 12:747
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control possessed by professional personnel charged with their care and
treatment has varied considerably.
On the one hand, liability has been imposed when authorities
failed to adequately control a mental patient within the confines of a
hospital.7  Liability has also been predicated upon the negligent dis-
charge of a mentally ill person from a psychiatric hospital.8  Other
courts have found liability for harm inflicted by mental patients who
had been "temporarily released" from professional supervisionY On
the other hand, sufficient control has been found to exist where hospital
personnel refused admittance to an emotionally disturbed individual.' 0
It seems clear from the foregoing case law that physical control
has a rather broad meaning and is not restricted to direct and immedi-
ate power over the actions of another. Instead, the term has been ap-
plied to situations in which hospital personnel, professionals and others
charged with the care and treatment of a mental patient had the ability
of denying the patient the opportunity to inflict harm on third persons."'
It was this almost pervasive definition of control that the California
court was presented with in the Tarasoff decision.
7. University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907).
8. Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Underwood v. United
States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 1119 A.
577 (1923); Homere v. State, 79 Misc. 2d 972, 361 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Ct. Cl. 1974), affd
48 App. Div. 2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1975). For an opposing viewpoint,
see Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949). Like Hicks and Un-
derwood, Kendrick involved the release of a mental patient from a Veteran's Administra-
tion hospital. However, there the court found that the government psychiatrists were
performing a discretionary act when they released the patient; thus, the United States was
immune from liability under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). See generally St. George
v. State, 203 Misc. 340, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 283
App. Div. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320
(1954) (no liability found because defendant psychiatrists simply made an honest error
in professional judgment).
9. Merchant's Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409
(D.N.D. 1967). Cf. Smart v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Okla. 1953) (no
liability found because the acts involved were held to fall within the "discretionary func-
tion" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970)).
10. Sce Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
11. One author has proposed that "de facto" control is the only type of control
creating a relationship falling within the second exception to the general rule discussed
earlier. See note 4 supra and accompanying text; Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing
Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HAnv. L. Rlv. 358, 365-66 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Stone]. But when other types of relationships falling within this exception
are examined, it is clear that something less than "de facto" control will be sufficient
to justify a departure from the general rule. See Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at 888-
98. The ability to exercise control seems to be the definitive factor in qualifying rela-
tionships.
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Tarasoff Decision
In Tarasoff, a mental patient was being treated by psychothera-
pists at a university hospital on a voluntary outpatient basis. During
a treatment session, the patient confided to one of the attending thera-
pists that he intended to kill a certain young woman. Believing that the
patient should be institutionally committed, the defendants requested
the assistance of the campus police in confining him. The patient was
subsequently taken into custody, but released when he promised to stay
away from the woman involved. 12
In holding for the deceased's representatives in a subsequent
wrongful death action, the California Supreme Court imposed a duty on
the defendant therapists to warn third parties of their patient an-
nounced intent to inflict harm upon them.13 Finding this duty to be
governed by a standard of reasonable care, the court stated:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards
of his profession should determine, that his patient presents
a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obliga-
tion to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim
against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require
the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending
upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to
warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim
of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other
steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances. 14
The foregoing standard of "reasonable care" in protecting third
parties is not, however, required of the psychotherapist until activated
by his initial determination as to the patient's violent tendencies. In
this regard, the court in Tarasoff delineated a higher standard of care
12. The plaintiffs also sought to have the police officer involved held liable for a
failure to confine the patient in Tarasoff. The officers were held to be immune from
liability under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5154 (West 1972). See 17 Cal. 3d at 449,
551 P.2d at 352-53, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33.
13. An additional allegation by the plaintiffs was that the defendant psychother-
apists were liable for a failure to confine the mental patient. However, the court held
that they were immune from this liablity under CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 856 (West Supp.
1977). This section grants immunity from liability to public employees charged with
official responsibility for the confinement and release of mental patients for any injuries
that might result from their determinations in these matters. However, the immunity
only applies if determinations are made in accordance with statutory guidelines. If the
determination is made in a wrongful or negligent manner, or if the employee wrongfully
or negligently fails to make such determination, the immunity will not attach. See 17
Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
14. Id. The court reiterated this same standard at a later point in the opinion. 17
Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
[Vol. 12:747
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which is required of the psychotherapist in making the initial deter-
mination of a patient's propensity for violence: "Obviously we do not
require that the therapist . . . render a perfect performance; the
therapist need only exercise 'that reasonable degree of skill, knowl-
edge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that
profession] under similar circumstances.' "15
As the court in Tarasoff recognized in its analysis of the extent
of the psychotherapist's duty to the intended victim of a patient, the
duty to warn has previously been imposed under factual circumstances
similar to those in the Tarasoff decision. In a line of medical malprac-
tice cases, physicians were held to a duty to warn persons likely to come
in contact with patients whom the physicians knew or should have
known were suffering from contagious diseases. 16 Although these
cases applied the higher professional standard of care to the diagnosis
by physicians of contagiousness, they adopted a standard of "ordinary
or reasonable care" in determining how physicians should act for the
protection of third parties once the diagnosis was made.
Aside from this limited area of nonfeasance, there appears to be
no duty to warn which is recognized as satisfying the actor's broader
duty to protect the injured party.17  This absence of recognition, how-
ever, cannot be taken as implying that such a duty cannot exist in the
context of psychotherapy. Examination of the standard of care re-
quired for the protection of third parties threatened by others shows
that a warning may, under some circumstances, be sufficient to satisfy
this duty. Thus, whether or not a duty arises depends on the facts of
each particular case. The question which should be asked in each
case is whether, under all the circumstances, a warning to the injured
15. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (citations omitted).
16. Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921); Hofmann v. Blackmen,
241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W.
663 (1919); Edwards v. Lamb, 69 N.H. 599, 45 A. 480 (1899); Wojcik v. Aluminum
Co., 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio
St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
17. See Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956), involving a duty to
warn a third party previously threatened by a mental patient. There, however, the de-
fendants had affirmatively undertaken the duty to notify this person when the mental
patient was released from the hospital.
A duty to warn is also recognized as an alternative to a duty to affirmatively act
for the protection of others where the relationship involves an invitee. The owner or
occupier of land is generally held to a duty to see that the land is reasonably safe for
the invitee or to use reasonable care to warn the invitee of any unreasonably dangerous
condition. This duty includes an obligation to protect the invitee from the dangerous
activities of third persons upon the property. Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at 903. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 315 (1965).
1977]
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party would have satisfied the standard of "reasonable care for the
prevention of harm to others."" In resolving this question, the con-
tagious disease cases have consistently recognized a warning as satisfy-
ing the standard of ordinary care.19
Apart from the standard of care imposed by Tarasoff regarding
the duty to warn, studies conducted by prominent psychotherapists cast
doubt on the standard of care imposed by the Tarasoff decision on psy-
chotherapists in determining the potential for violence by their patients.
In one such study, Professor Bernard L. Diamond of the University of
California concluded that psychotherapists cannot predict the propen-
sity for violence with any reasonable degree of accuracy.20 Professor
Diamond's study also discussed other clinical studies that have at-
tempted to formulate criteria by which violent tendencies may be
diagnosed. Diamond found that many of the personality traits utilized
as criteria are similarly prevalent in nonviolent individuals.
Moreover, the criteria utilized in these studies are inconsistent
from study to study.2 Similarly, the Diamond report referred to
several statistical studies which demonstrate the tendency by therapists
to grossly overpredict dangerousness in patients and clients.2 Finally,
other studies have concluded that no correlation exists between mental
18. Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at 888. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW or
ToRTS 1054-55 (1956); PROSSER, supra note 4, at 350.
19. See cases at note 16 supra. Dean Prosser has said, in describing that fictitious
perdon who establishes the standard of care, that phrases such as "reasonable man" or
"prudent man" or "man of ordinary sense using ordinary care and skill" are all intended
to mean much the same thing. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 150.
20. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 PA. L. REV. 439,
440, 451-52 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Diamond]. See People v. Burnick, 14 Cal.
3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the
Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693
(1974).
21. Diamond, supra note 20, at 440-44.
22. Id. at 444-47. In these studies, it was estimated that dangerousness was overpre-
dicted between ten and one hundred times its actual incidence. Likewise, Dr. Stone is
of the view that imposing liability for a failure to predict violence will result in an in-
crease of overprediction. Stone, supra note 11, at 372.
A new study that is particularly graphic was concerned with the so-called Baxstrom
patients. In a decision of the United States Supreme Court, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966), 967 patients in New York maximum security hospitals for the crim-
inally insane were ordered transferred to ordinary mental hospitals because the statute
under which they were originally committed to these hospitals was held violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Four and one-half years after this
decision, one-third of these patients were back in the community. This is a higher re-
lease rate than for mental patients generally. Only 26 of the 967, or 2.7 percent, had
been returned either civilly or criminally to hospitals for the criminally insane. Dr.
Henry J. Steadman, a research sociologist for the New York Department of Mental
Hygiene, who performed extensive research on the Baxstrom patients, examined factors
6
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illness and the propensity for violence. 23  Recognizing the problems
concerning the diagnosis of dangerousness, Professor Diamond con-
cluded his study by warning that psychiatrists and others concerned
with human behavior should acknowledge their inability to predict
violence in patients and should not volunteer such predictions.
24
The federal judiciary has also recognized the inherent difficulty
in predicting an individual's disposition toward violence. Mr. Justice
Douglas, in his dissent from the dismissal of certiorari in Murel v. Bal-
timore City Criminal Court, 5 referred to the following testimony
before a congressional subcommittee:
A diagnosis of mental illness tells us nothing about whether
the person so diagnosed is or is not dangerous. Some mental
patients are dangerous, some are not. Perhaps the psychia-
trist is an expert at deciding whether a person is mentally ill,
but is he an expert at predicting which of the persons so
diagnosed are dangerous? Sane people, too, are dangerous,
and it may legitimately be inquired whether there is anything
in the education, training or experience of psychiatrists which
renders them particularly adept at predicting dangerous be-
havior. Predictions of dangerous behavior, no matter who
makes them, are incredibly inaccurate, and there is a growing
consensus that psychiatrists are not uniquely qualified to
predict dangerous behavior and are, in fact, less accurate in
their predictions than other professionals .
2
Because of the recognized difficulty in predicting dangerous
behavior, the standard of care imposed by Tarasoff as to the initial de-
termination of violence is too strict a standard. Such a standard would
require psychotherapists to possess a degree of skill that simply does
differentiating the returnees from the rest of the group. He found no reason to explain
why the returnees should act any more violently than the others, thus necessitating their
return. Steadman, Follow-Up on Baxstrom Patients Returned to Hospitals for the Crim-
inally Insane, 130 AM. I. PSYCH. 317 (1973) (cited in Diamond, supra note 20, at 446-
47).
23. Diamond, supra note 20, at 447-50.
24. Id. at 452.
25. 407 U.S. 355 (1972). Other cases recognizing this difficulty in prediction in-
clude Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S.
366 (1956); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975); People v. Burnick,
14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975); St. George v. State, 203 Misc.
340, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 283 App. Div. 245, 127
N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 681, 4124 N.E.2d 320 (1954).
26. 407 U.S. at 364-65, no.2. This quote is taken from the testimony of Bruce J.
Ennis, Staff Attorney of the New York Civil Liberties Union and Director of the Civil
Liberties and Mental Illness Project, before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., 277-78 (1969-70).
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not exist.27  Psychotherapists should only be held to the general stan-
dard of acting reasonably for the protection of the third parties.
It should be emphasized that the ability to predict violent tenden-
cies is synonymous with the ability to foresee the risk of such danger
and therefore is closely related to the concept of proximate cause.
While Tarasoff did not deal with proximate cause,28 it is certainly
an issue that should have been considered. When the psychotherapist
has negligently failed to control his patient, or has failed to warn the
intended victim and injury has resulted, a question is raised as to
whether the psychotherapist's negligence is the proximate cause of the
injury or whether the intentional act of the patient is an intervening
cause of the injury. When a defendant's negligence creates a condition
whereby the commission of an intentionally harmful act by another be-
comes more likely, it seems clear that the intentional act cuts off the
effect of the defendant's negligence unless the defendant knew or
should have known that his negligence would create such a condition
and opportunity. 29 Therefore, even though the psychotherapist may
have a duty to act reasonably to prevent harm to third parties
threatened by his patients, establishing proximate cause would seem to
present a difficult task for plaintiffs in light of the inability on the part
of psychotherapists to predict violence in their patients and foresee the
risks posed to others.
Duty to Warn Versus Confidential Communications
Thus far this discussion has centered upon the psychotherapist's
duty to protect third parties from the violent acts of his patients. But
what of the psychotherapist's professional duty to his patients? An-
other criticism of Tarasoff is that imposing a duty on psychotherapists
to warn persons threatened by their patients requires a revelation of a
patient's confidential communications made to his therapist.
27. The court in Tarasoff apparently recognized the problems involved in predicting
violence. However, it did not take these into consideration when it formulated a stand-
ard for the preliminary determination of violence based upon the professional skill of
psychotherapists generally. 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
28. Proximate cause was dealt with in both the majority and dissenting opinions of
the court of appeals decision in Tarasoff. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer. of Cali-
fornia, 33 Cal. App. 3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 883-84, 900-01 (1973).
29. See Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Underwood v.
United States, 356 F.2d 92, 99 (5th Cir. 1966); PRossER, supra note 4, at 275; RMSTATE-
NMNT (SEcOND) oiF TORTS, §§ 302B, 448-449 (1965).
[Vol. IZ: 747
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The physician's ethical duty of confidentiality goes back to the time
of Hippocrates8 0 and is embodied in the ethics of the American Medical
Association:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him
in the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may
observe in the character of patients, unless he is required to
do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect
the welfare of the individual or of the community. 1
Where psychotherapy is concerned, however, confidentiality is more
than just an ethical obligation. Ideally, psychotherapy involves com-
plete candor and openness between patient and therapist. To a large
extent, the success of psychotherapy is dependent on the patient's
revelation of his inner feelings and thoughts. Every bit of information
obtained by the psychotherapist in this manner is vital to the treatment
of the patient. "Saying all is the desideratum. 82  Accordingly, it is
recognized that confidentiality is vital to effective psychotherapeutic
treatment and is a necessary inducement to the patient's seeking
psychotherapeutic help.33
Even those who strongly support the preservation of confidential-
ity, however, recognized that the revelation of a confidence is justifiable
in preventing the commission of a crime or a tort. 4 The instances
where this is proper must, of course, lie within the discretion of the
therapist, using his own good judgment and relying upon his conscience
30. "What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the
treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad,
I will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about." L. EDELSTEIN,
Tim HIppocRTic OATH 3 (1943).
31. A.M.A. PRINCIPLES oF MEDICAL ETHcs § 9 (1957) (emphasis added). Among
the ranks of psychotherapists, psychiatrists are specializing physicians, so they, at least,
would be bound by this principle.
32. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE
L. REV. 175, 186 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Slovenko]. See Taylor v. United States,
222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the
Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 618-20 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Fisher]; Fleming & Moximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1025, 1031-32 (1974).
33. See Fisher, supra note 32, at 618; Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privi-
lege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CoNN. B.J. 175, 178-79
(1962); Slovenko, supra note 32, at 187-88. It has been questioned whether confiden-
tiality is necessary to protect these interests of the patient. It is felt that the patient's
interests in his constitutional rights of due process, privacy, and liberty are the most im-
portant interests to be protected by preserving confidentiality between psychotherapist
and patient. Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma,
62 CAL. L. REnV. 1025, 1039-64 (1974).
34. See Fisher, supra note 32, at 633; Slovenko, supra note 32, at 197-98. This ex-
ception is in accord with the AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETmCS § 9 (1957).
1977]
9
Nesbitt: Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California: Psychotherap
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
to assure effective treatment of his patients.85 It is arguable that
Taraso fs sanction of possible tort liability for a failure to reveal confi-
dences by way of warning, may inhibit the psychotherapist's judgment.
Of course, other repercussions may be felt by the psychotherapist
who is forced to reveal the confidences of his patients. Not only may
patients be discouraged from seeking help and treatment, but liability
may be imposed for improper revelation of a confidence. There are
basically four types of actions that are available for wrongful disclosure
of a confidence: (1) an action for breach of the contractual relation-
ship between doctor and patient based upon an implied term of confi-
dentiality; (2) an action for denial of the patient's right of privacy; (3)
an action for the breach of the physician's fiduciary duty of confidential-
ity; and (4) an action based upon doctor-patient privilege statutes
which have been construed as embodying a remedy for breach of confi-
dence. 83 Of great importance to this discussion, however, are the psy-
chotherapist's possible defenses. Basically, the defenses are the same
as those for right of privacy and defamation actions.17
Berry v. Moench 8 involved a libel suit initiated by a patient
against his former psychiatrist. After learning that his daughter was
contemplating marriage to the patient, the girl's father, a personal
friend of the defendant psychiatrist, solicited information from the
doctor about his patient. The psychiatrist replied, warning the father
that his daughter should "run as fast and as far as she possibly could
in any direction away from [the plaintiff]." 39 The court held that a con-
ditional privilege arose under the circumstances protecting the defend-
ant from liability. In describing the circumstances which gave rise to
the psychiatrist's conditional privilege, the court stated:
mhe privilege is not something which arises automatically
and becomes absolute merely because there is an interest to
protect. It has its origin in, and it is governed by, the rules
of good sense and customary conduct of people motivated by
good will and proper consideration for others ...
...One purveying such information about one person
to protect another is obliged to consider the likelihood and
the extent of benefit to the recipient, if the matter is true,
35. See Fisher, supra note 32, at 633; Slovenko, supra note 32, at 198.
36. Comment, Physicians and Surgeons: Civil Liability for a Physician Who Dis-
closes Medical Information Obtained Within the Doctor-Patient Relationship, in a Non-
litigation Setting, 28 OKR A. L. RaV. 658, 662-69 (1975).
37. Id. at 669.
38. 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
39. Id. at -, 331 P.2d at 816.
[V'el. 12:747
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as compared with the likelihood of injury and the extent
thereof to the subject, if it proves false, or improper to reveal.
Whether the privilege exists, depends upon generally ac-
cepted standards of decent conduct. Applying that standard,
it exists if the recipient has the type of interest in the matter,
and the publisher stands in such a relation to him, that it
would reasonably be considered the duty of the publisher to
give the information.4"
The court's observation would appear to correlate with the
standard of care which creates the duty to act for the protection of third
parties. 41  Thus, a psychotherapist avoids liability to both his patient
and third parties if he warns others of the potential dangerous behavior
that a patient may exhibit, provided that a warning is a reasonable
method of satisfying his duty to act for the protection of others.
Conclusion
The concern in Tarasoff focused on protecting the public from the
violence of the mentally ill. Whether the court has provided sufficient
protection by imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn prospective
victims and others is questionable in light of the extreme difficulty in
accurately predicting violent behavior. The alternative to a warning
would seem to be physical commitment of potentially violent mental
patients.42 Such an alternative not only suffers from the problem of
accurately predicting the likelihood of violence, but also unduly limits
the ability of psychotherapists to use a variety of techniques to treat
mental illness.
For the ultimate protection of society, the psychotherapist must be
free to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of any course of treat-
ment. Because of the variable and delicate nature of the situations the
psychotherapist may face, he cannot be bound by rigid standards of
care. To the extent that Tarasoff restricts the flexibility of responses
by imposing a duty to warn, an impediment to effective treatment of
the mentally ill has been imposed which may add little, if any, support
to the arsenal presently employed for the protection of society.
Nancy A. Nesbitt
40. Id. at -, 331 P.2d at 818 (footnote omitted).
41. See notes 7-17 supra and accompanying text.
42. See Stone, supra note 11, at 374.
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